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Offering a detailed account of Kantian Gesinnung, these two sections provide compelling evidence that 'conviction' expresses Kant's meaning more accurately than either 'disposition' or 'attitude'. Finally, section 4 summarizes and clarifies the chief conclusion of this study, that Kantian Gesinnung, understood as a moral species of 'conviction', functions not as a problematic metaphysical assumption, nor as a psychological tool, but as a volitional principle that fills a heretofore neglected gap in Kant's theory of propositional attitudes.
Kant's General Portrayal of Gesinnung as Principled Moral Conviction
In this and the following section I analyze, respectively, Kant's various types of moral and religious uses of 'Gesinnung' in Religion. While this article's main goal is to understand Kantian Gesinnung as such, an inevitable secondary concern is of course to consider which English word best reflects Kant's intended meaning. The closest Kant ever comes to defining 'Gesinnung' is in the first of the 17 passages where the term is directly modified by 'bös-' ('evil') and/or 'gut-' ('good'), as specified in the Appendix (see Table 1 , I.B). He writes (6: 23n.10): 'between an evil and a good Gesinnung (inward principle of maxims) − by which the morality of the action must also be judged − there is no mean'. This highlights three key features of Kantian Gesinnung: (1) it is a specific kind of principle, one that is (a) 'inward' 6 and (b) maxim-oriented; 7 (2) it can be either good or evil, with no intermediate position between these options; and (3) it is the proper basis for judging any action's moral worth. While 'disposition', 'attitude' and 'conviction' all refer to features of a person's inner life (1a), neither 'disposition' nor 'attitude' typically refers to a consciously chosen, maxim-oriented principle (1b). By contrast, 'conviction' normally does refer to just such a self-chosen, underlying principle determining one's beliefs and/or actions.
This supports my hypothesis that Kantian Gesinnung is a moral type of Überzeugung, 8 a maximoriented principle that establishes either good or evil (not both) at the foundation of one's moral 5 nature, 9 and explains why Kant usually modifies 'Gesinnung' with explicitly moral terms.
Neglecting the fact that Kant defines 'Gesinnung' as a principle of moral decision-making, not as a metaphysical constituent of human nature, I previously treated 'Gesinnung' as virtually synonymous with 'heart' (see e.g. Palmquist 2000, §VII.2) − a term Kant often uses in close association with 'Gesinnung' (see e.g. 6: 37.20). While both terms refer to aspects of human nature, the heart is not a subjective inner principle of maxim-formation; it is the disposition (the Sinnesart) that forms within us on the basis of our Gesinnung(en). Although the heart does fulfil a dispositional function for Kant, one should not infer that 'heart' and 'Gesinnung' are functionally equivalent. The only viable option that obviously refers to a rational principle determining the character of one's disposition (or to the process whereby one's disposition is so determined by a rational principle) is 'conviction'. The remainder of this section therefore conducts an experiment, testing the hypothesis that translating Kant's 'Gesinnung' as 'conviction' is viable: examining all 32 occurrences of 'Gesinnung' that are modified by 'moral' (i.e. 'moralischen/er' or 'sittlichen/er') should determine whether Kant's text can be cogently read as referring to moral conviction.
Kant's most common way of using 'Gesinnung' throughout Religion, comprising nearly 20 per cent of all occurrences, is to modify it with 'moral'. Scanning the context of each of Kant's 28 references to moralischen/er Gesinnung reveals that in the first half of the book Kant calls it a way of thinking (6: 30.17) that can be corrupted by evil maxims: it is the 'power' (Kraft) (61. 35) to manifest virtue (35.01), but tends to be weakened by falsity (38.25); it is not completely hidden from us, for we can be conscious of it (62.04). Because a person is always 'a being of the world' (Weltwesen), our moral conviction will always be in the process of 'becoming', no matter how pure it may be (74-5n). Unfortunately, religious traditions often introduce external rituals 6 and ceremonies that downplay 'the inwardness [das Innere] of moral conviction' (79.26); such 'ceremonial faith' tends to 'displace all moral conviction' (81n.37), even though the latter is the very basis for the 'spirit' and 'truth' of all religion (84. 19 ) − a point examined further in section 3. These passages never link Gesinnung to any feeling or other psychological feature characteristic of human attitudes; at most, they only hint that Kant might think of it as a metaphysical component of the mind. 10 By contrast, the explicit references to the role of thinking, maxim-choosing, conscious awareness, and the process of conforming external actions to an internal ideal all indicate that the 'principle' he calls our Gesinnung is a rational, judgement-like power, akin to discernment (see note 10) − features that all resonate well with 'conviction'.
In the second half of Religion Kant states that 'the matter' of venerating God (namely, observing 'all duties as his commands' − this being Kant's 'subjective' definition of religion) occurs 'in a moral conviction' (6: 105.13). The force of this 'in' is not one of metaphysical containment, In the General Comment to the Third Piece Kant further explains that 'the pure moral conviction' (139.01) is 'inseparably linked' with 'the idea … of the highest good', and that our inability to realize the latter draws us 'toward the faith in the cooperation or arrangement, by a moral ruler of the world, through which alone this purpose is possible'. Again, Kant here treats
Gesinnung not as a feeling or fixed component of human nature, like our predisposition to good or propensity to evil, but as an idea-driven power that generates the human need to have faith.
Kant is directly associating Gesinnung with his framework of propositional attitudes, as a moral way of being convinced. Indeed, in a footnote near the end of that General Comment, he openly states that we can assess religious 'merit' (146n.10) by observing which persons exhibit 'a superiority of morality not in reference to the law … but in comparison with other human beings in regard to their moral conviction'.
In the Fourth Piece Kant claims that one of the main principles of Jesus' teachings is that 'only the pure moral conviction' can render a person 'satisfactory to God' (6: 159.13) − an explicitly religious claim, examined further in section 3. here are we fully informed of how religious conviction supplements bare moral conviction.
In the Fourth Piece, Kant first describes religious Gesinnung as 'the guilty awe' we feel toward
God that manifests itself 'in all our dutiful actions generally' even though 'this awe is not a special action of religion', nor a special duty to God (6: 154n). This is one of the few instances in
Religion where 'Gesinnung' seems to refer to a psychological attitude rather than to a component of human nature (a disposition) or a reasoned commitment (a conviction). Yet Kant's intention here is not to identify religious conviction with guilty awe, but to explain that the former typically gives rise to the latter for religious believers because their type of moral conviction Of all evidence suggesting that Kant is referring to what we nowadays call convictions, probably the strongest comes in the passages that are undoubtedly the heart of Kant's defence of explicitly religious Gesinnung: his references to the Gesinnung made available by the 'archetype' of perfect humanity and to this Gesinnung as the sole path to becoming 'satisfactory to God' (cf. The exit from the corrupted into the good conviction (as 'the dying of the old human being,'
'crucifying of the flesh') is in itself already a sacrifice and an entrance upon a long series of life's ills that the new human being takes upon himself in the conviction of the Son of God − in other words, merely for the sake of the good − but that yet were actually deserved by a different human being, namely the old one, as punishment (for, the old one is morally a different human being).
Once again, Kant describes the archetype's Gesinnung, which alone is capable of satisfying God, as the conscious determination to accept suffering 'merely for the sake of the good' − a decision that (when done in the context of belief in God, as Kant assumes here) can aptly be described as a religious conviction. yet also consider suffering 'as punishing, and hence confesses thereby a punishability, and thus also a conviction dissatisfactory to God'. He answers affirmatively, arguing that the converted person accepts punishment vicariously, on behalf of 'the old human being'. Kant goes on to call this explanation of how 'a human being who is indeed guilty … has nonetheless passed into a conviction satisfactory to God' (76.09) 'a deduction' of the theological concept of 'justification'. 17 In the second half of Religion Kant argues that 'one must with all one's powers strive after the holy conviction of a lifestyle satisfactory to God' (120.11), in the hope that this 'will complement the lack of the deed, onto whichever kind of lack it may be added, in consideration of honest conviction'. 18 This 'conviction satisfactory to God' (143.24) is 'a determination of the will to the good' (i.e. a rational function of volition, not a psychological attitude or a metaphysical disposition). But it is one that a human being 'cannot bring forth on his own', due to 'the natural corruption within him'; so in order to realize its purpose, we must appeal beyond moral Gesinnung, to religious beliefs (such as practical faith in the archetype) and practices.
Although German does not allow reference to a 'Gesinnung daß', in the way English allows reference to a 'conviction that', 19 Kant does identify false Gesinnung with 'a heartfelt wish that'
God will receive one's offerings in lieu of a good lifestyle: 'when he says that he brings even his heart to God', the deluded believer 'understands by this not the conviction of a lifestyle satisfactory to God, but a heartfelt wish that those offerings may be taken up in payment for that 
Gesinnung as a Propositional Attitude of Principled, Convinced Faith
The foregoing analysis of Kantian Gesinnung provides ample evidence that the fundamental change from evil-heartedness to good-heartedness that is a central theme in Religion is best understood as being prompted by a change in a person's deeply held, rationally-grounded convictions; changes in our psychological attitudes or at a metaphysical level are hardly addressed, if at all. This conclusion has implications for how we understand the deepest core of as 'convince'. 22 By translating two forms of the same word as two different English words, this convention fails to reflect accurately the cognate relationship between the corresponding German terms. To correct this (minor but significant) inconsistency, it seems reasonable to translate Überzeugung as either 'convincing' or (occasionally) 'convincement'
Translating 'Gesinnung' as 'conviction' in any case fills a lacuna that has gone virtually unnoticed in the literature: the need to identify the status of the assent that arises out of
Gesinnung-based reasoning, so that Gesinnung can find its place in Kant's theory of propositional attitudes. 24 Translating 'Gesinnung' as 'conviction' is a perfect synthesis of the potentially-metaphysical 'disposition' and the potentially-psychological 'attitude', for it reminds us that we must be convinced of something, and convinced of it on the basis of moral concepts and principles that can be expressed as maxims, in order to claim we have genuine moral/religious conviction. A crucial difference between Überzeugung (in either its moral or logical applications) and
Gesinnung, for Kant, is that the former must be intersubjectively communicable, whereas the foregoing study provides only minimal evidence that this requirement applies to the latter. Kant does say in the third Critique that 'if cognitions are to be able to be communicated, then the mental state, i.e. the Gesinnung of the cognitive powers for a cognition in general … must also be capable of being universally communicated' ( §21, 5: 238). This use of 'Gesinnung', however, is non-standard, referring to the subjective mental state that accompanies a cognitive process that has objective validity. As such, Kant's point seems to be that, even though an ordinary (moral or religious) Gesinnung may not be universally communicable, 25 due to its inherently subjective Kantian Überzeugung is a form of assent that has a 'subjective sufficiency' that is intersubjectively valid: what is morally (or practically) convincing produces belief/faith on this basis; what is logically (or theoretically) convincing produces knowledge by also incorporating objective sufficiency. The foregoing study demonstrates that Gesinnung is equivalent to a moral and/or religious type of Überzeugung: whereas being logically convinced is the mental state associated with cognition (Erkenntnis) and leading to knowledge (Wissen), being morally convinced is the mental state associated with conviction (Gesinnung) and leading to faith (Glaube). Confirming the consistency of this suggestion with Kant's broader use of these terms 21 would be a worthwhile undertaking, but is beyond the scope of this study.
We can, however, test this new way of understanding how Gesinnung fits into Kant's taxonomy of propositional attitudes by examining a passage where 'Überzeugung' and 'Gesinnung' appear in close association (6: 51.09, 51.12):
Now, because this merely leads to a progress, advancing ad infinitum, from the bad to the better, it follows that the transformation of the evil human being's Gesinnung into that of a good human being must be posited in the change, in accordance with the law of morals, of the supreme inward basis for the acceptance of all his maxims, insofar as this new basis (the new heart) is now itself unchangeable. Überzeugung concerning this, however, the human being can indeed not reach naturally, neither through immediate consciousness nor through the proof of the lifestyle he has led thus far; for the depth of the heart (the subjective first basis of his maxims) is inscrutable to himself.
This passage might appear to present counterevidence to my claim that Gesinnung is a specific type of Überzeugung: Kant seems to say it is impossible to be convinced regarding the nature of our conviction. However, what he actually says is that in the case of conviction (Gesinnung), convincing (Überzeugung) cannot occur naturally; that is, to be convinced about the character of one's (moral/religious) convictions, one must appeal to evidence that goes beyond what is merely natural (i.e. empirical). As such, this passage confirms my suggested taxonomy, by pointing out that Gesinnung is a type of Überzeugung that appeals to something that transcends natural causality, occurring whenever one engages in moral or (genuine) religious reasoning. To affirm a conviction (Gesinnung), our reasoning must be convincing (Überzeugung), but not by appealing to natural (i.e. objective) evidence that aims at knowledge; we must instead appeal to moral (i.e. 22 subjective) evidence that aims at faith.
We have seen that interpreting Kantian Gesinnung as a form of principled conviction lends a significant degree of clarity to Kant's difficult theory: it transforms the problem of noumenal choice from a metaphysical appeal to a quasi-magical 'event' that somehow 'occurs' in a hidden, transcendent realm (the realm where 'the disposition' supposedly exists), into a perspectival appeal to our everyday experience of the ordinary rational thinking and willing that we normally call 'convictions'. Although this realization on its own does not solve all of the conundrums that have plagued readers of Religion, it does render Kant's apparent appeal to a mysterious 'noumenal' realm far less troublesome. At the very least, it shows that Kant's appeal to Gesinnung in religious situations is no more troubling than a recognition -if such be requiredof the 'noumenal' character of any aspect of human existence. For in such passages, Kant is claiming no more than this: our inner convictions constitute a standpoint that is not subject to the determinations of the theoretical standpoint (i.e. empirical causality), because the essential nature of this standpoint is a self-chosen, rational commitment.
Appendix Statistics on Kant's Use of 'G/gesinn-' Terms in Religion
A simple statistical comparison suggests that 'Gesinnung' plays a far more significant role in Religion than in Kant's main Critical writings. Together with its variants, 'Gesinnung' occurs nearly 10 times more frequently in Religion (an average of once every 1.2 Akademie Ausgabe pages) than in the three Critiques and Groundwork (where it occurs on average once every 11.4 pages). Gesinnung and its variants occur: 15 times in the first Critique (552 pages); 60 times in the second Critique (163 pages); 17 times in the third Critique (321 pages); and 6 times in Groundwork (79 pages). These four works therefore have 98 occurrences of 'Gesinnung' in 1115 23 Akademie Ausgabe pages, while Religion has 169 occurrences in 202 pages. Thus Religion has nearly twice (1.7 times) as many occurrences as all four previous works combined. These statistics suggest that, whereas Kant's elusive Gesinnung plays no crucial role in the main arguments of the first and third Critiques, and its role in his moral theory is optional (since it occurs only rarely in Groundwork but quite often in the second Critique), its role in Religion is essential. Explaining the main features of Kantian ethics without reference to 'Gesinnung' would be fairly easy, but one would be at a loss to explain the key positions defended in Religion without focusing on this central term. Table 1 Another informative way of analyzing the 169 occurrences of 'Gesinnung' (and its cognates) in
Religion is to classify each according to its grammatical form. Over three-quarters (128) consist of the simple singular noun, 'Gesinnung', standing alone, with an additional 10 per cent (17) being the plural noun, 'Gesinnungen'. Of the remaining 24 occurrences, 14 are compound nouns (10 singular, 4 plural), attaching the prefixes 'Herzens-' (3), 'Religions-' (6), or 'Tugend-' (5) to '-gesinnung', while 10 are various forms of the verbal root, 'gesinn-' (6 of these being compound, attaching 'Gleich-', 'gut-', or 'W/wohl-' to '-gesinnten'). Few interpreters acknowledge that Kant's use of the plural is so frequent − over 12 per cent of the total! − yet this is a major drawback for the alternative translations: a plurality of metaphysical dispositions or psychological attitudes is quite perplexing, while people frequently refer to plural convictions 25 without any sense of awkwardness (cf. note 44).
A Brief History of English Translations of Kant's 'Gesinnung'
The standard practice of translating 'Gesinnung' as 'disposition' was first introduced by T.K. Religion. We each added a footnote, defending our preferred usage, and agreed to disagree. 29 My footnote proposed 'conviction' as the best English equivalent of 'Gesinnung'; 30 but, admitting that such an option faces difficulties that would need to be resolved before actually employing this translation, I opted for the relative security of the time-honoured 'disposition' for the purposes of that Introduction.
Evidence from Standard Definitions of Key Terms
Pluhar grounds his defence of 'attitude' on the definition of 'Gesinnung' in Duden, the standard The Oxford-Duden translation for 'Gesinnung' weakens the significance of the major objection to my proposal: if 'Gesinnung' and 'Überzeugung' were not closely related terms, then using 'conviction' for the former would cause hopeless confusion, since Kant clearly defines the latter as a technical term. 37 Hiding this similarity by changing the translation of 'Überzeugung' to a synonym, such as 'persuasion', would have an undesirable ripple effect, because another of Kant's technical terms, 'Überredung', is normally translated as 'persuasion'. 38 These two terms both have distinct and explicit roles to play in Kant's theory of propositional attitudes (see Figure   1 ) − an interesting turn of phrase, given that 'attitude' is one of the main alternatives for 29 translating 'Gesinnung'! That Pluhar's preferred translation is a word used to describe the general class that my preferred translation belongs to is more than a mere coincidence. For my claim that Kantian Gesinnung is a species of Überzeugung implies that it is a kind of 'attitude'.
This possibility gives rise to a second question that can be answered only by thoroughly examining Kant's actual use of 'Gesinnung': Is there any evidence that Kant regards human
Gesinnung as a propositional attitude? By answering this question affirmatively, the foregoing study firmly supports using 'conviction'; likewise, using similar English terms for 'Gesinnung'
and 'Überzeugung' is rendered unproblematic. sticking with the safety of tradition and assuming Kant has in mind precisely the sort of entity that tends to be implied by 'disposition'? Before we assess the standard definitions of 'disposition', note that 'disposition' has the disadvantage of being easily confused with 'predisposition', the typical translation for Kant's 'Anlage'. The latter undoubtedly does refer to a metaphysical aspect of human nature, as Kant repeatedly refers to the human predisposition(s)
as 'innate'. Indeed, the similarity between these terms is a common source of confusion for beginning students of Kant, and occasionally even trips up seasoned scholars, especially those who are less familiar with Kant's German. 30. 4 The Appendix explains, especially in the third section, how these three questions arise out of the rather complex hermeneutical controversies that underlie the discussion that follows. 5 Although Table 1 (volume 6), sometimes followed by the line number. 6 The nine passages cited in Table 1 .II.B provide further details about how Gesinnung functions as an 'inward' and therefore 'supersensible' feature of the mind: its 'supreme basis' cannot be derived from temporal volition (25.13); 'outer experience' cannot disclose its 'inwardness' (63.15); being 'supersensible', it enables us to conceive of how empirically good behaviour relates to the ultimate goal of being 'good' (67.11); because its 'morally subjective principle' is 'supersensible', it 'can be thought only as an absolute unity' (70n.32); it makes a converted person 'new', 'as an intelligible being' (74.21); calling God 'a knower of hearts' means God sees what is 'most inward' in our Gesinnungen (99.14), for Gesinnung is an 'invisible' heart-service that entails 'observance of all true duties as divine commands ' (192.22) ; repeatedly reminding ourselves of it enables us to establish 'good firmly within ourselves' (193.05); and God knows this 'inward' feature of our heart even without any outward 'explanation' of our 'wish ' (194.32) .
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